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Rhetoric, Pragmatism and the Interdisciplinary Turn
in Legal Criticism-A Study of Altruistic
Judicial Argument
I. THE SETTING
It is a pleasure to be the United States Reporter for a one-word
topic as spacious and beguiling as "arguability." Since most academic
writing in this country has become argument, the topic might be read
locally to authorize a paper on any legal subject. The longer French
version of the topic, however, seems to impose some discipline. With
help, I translate it as: "What criteria would you use to determine the
possibility of presenting a given legal argument?"1 A literal-minded
(and no doubt acceptable) approach to this topic might discuss
whether or why certain arguments are effective before judges of the
writer's country.
A response that narrow, however, does not seem the only possi-
bility. Even the French version grants considerable license, particu-
larly when we recall that our topic is actually a subdivision of the
second topic set for the Fifteenth Congress: "General Legal Theory
and Legal Philosophy." Scholars who persist in the searches tradi-
tional to legal philosophy (jurisprudence)2, for overarching values or
for broad systemic order in law, would probably see our topic as an
open door. These metatheorists would read "a given legal argument"
as any assertion of legal justification-no matter how complex or the-
oretical-made in court, in the community, or merely in one's mind.
GENE R. SHREVE is Richard S. Melvin Professor of Law, Indiana University. The au-
thor wishes to thank Fred Aman, Dan Conkle, Perry Hodges, Ken Dau-Schmidt,
Steve Johnson, Bruce Markell, Marshall Leaffer, Lauren Robel, Emily Van Tassel,
and Elisabeth Zoller for their helpful comments on this Essay.
1. "Quels criteres pour determiner la possibilite de plaider un argument
juridique donne?"
2. This Report usually employs "jurisprudence" in place of "philosophy of law"-
a practice that is permissible so long as we give to jurisprudence its broadest and
most common meaning: "the study not of the actual laws of particular legal systems,
but of the general concepts and principles that underlie a legal system or that are
common to all such systems." Soper, "Jurisprudence," in the Cambridge Dictionary of
Philosophy 394 (1995).
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Neither the narrow nor the expansive reading of our topic is free
of difficulty. They actually pose something of a dilemma.
In the United States, it would probably be a fatal contradiction to
treat the topic narrowly yet call the result a paper on jurisprudence.
The presumptions here are that any useful writing on jurisprudence
must be a work of high intellectual purpose, preferably one that dis-
plays dazzling theory, erudition extending to nonlegal disciplines,
and a flair for confrontation. 3 So strong are these presumptions that,
however helpful an essay using the narrow interpretation of our topic
might be in other respects, it would not be an authentic specimen of
jurisprudence scholarship in this country.
Yet, while an expansive interpretation of our topic would con-
form to the outlook here, problems also attend that option. The arena
of metatheory is important, perhaps central, to contemporary schol-
arship in the United States.4 The problem is that legal scholarship in
the United States is in a process of disintegration. 5 Edward Rubin
recently noted that the "conceptual disarray of legal scholarship has
3. The present shape of jurisprudence scholarship has been summarized this
way. Once "legal scholars... assumed that jurisprudence can incorporate intellectual
disagreements about law into a larger harmonious whole," Minda, "Jurisprudence at
Century's End," 43 J. Leg. Ed. 27, 27 (1993). But the subject has since fragmented
into "heated debate about the relationship among law, culture, politics, economics and
morality." Id. at 28. Large-scale studies of the shift include Neil Duxbury, Patterns of
American Jurisprudence (1995); Gary Minda, Postmodern Legal Movements-Law
and Jurisprudence at Century's End (1995).
4. Within that arena are metatheorists (who compete with other metatheorists)
and the detractors of metatheory. Metatheorists do not always sound like traditional-
ists, but they traffic on the same level. That is, metatheorists often undertake broad-
spectrum inquires about personal rights and obligations, and about order and author-
ity in the law. They include Berman, "Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics,
Morality, and History," 76 Calif L. Rev. 799 (1988); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights
Seriously (1977); George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Legal Thought (1996); Fried,
"Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism," 73 Cornell L. Rev. 331 (1988); Richard
A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (1990); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice
(1971).
Metatheory's detractors frequently denounce it as futile or worse. Thus, while
they are negative in perspective, they extend significantly the discussion of metathe-
ory. Examples may be found in the intersecting realms of critical legal studies, see
e.g., Jabbari, "From Criticism to Construction in Modern Critical Legal Theory," 12
Oxford J. of Leg. Studies 507 (1992); Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies
(1987); Solum, "On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma," 54 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 462 (1987); post-modern legal theory, see e.g., Feldman, "The Politics of
Postmodern Jurisprudence," 95 Mich. L. Rev. 166 (1966); "Postmodernism and Law: A
Symposium," 62 U. Colo. L. Rev. 439 (1991); "Symposium-Beyond Critique: Law,
Culture, and the Politics of Form," 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1595 (191); and what has been
called outsider scholarship, see e.g., Abrahms, "Hearing the Call of Stories," 79 Cal. L.
Rev. 971 (1991); Delgado, "Recasting the American Race Problem," 79 Cal. L. Rev.
1389 (1991); Eskridge, "Outsider-Insiders: The Academy of the Closet," 71 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 977 (1996); Torres, "Critical Race Theory: The Decline of the Universalist
Ideal and the Hope of Plural Justice-Some Observations and Questions of Emerging
Phenomenon," 75 Minn. L. Rev. 993 (1991).
5. See supra nn. 2 and 3.
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become so familiar to us that we have ceased to regret it."6 Pierre
Schlag wrote in a similar vein:
There is nothing quite like the exhilarating experience
that comes from reading a provocative new piece of legal
thought. Of course, at some point this exhilaration will give
way to ennui as the new piece of legal thought unravels-
ultimately to be classified as yet another possibly clever,
perhaps thoughtful, but nonetheless utterly failed
contribution.7
No one, of course, takes these observations completely to heart.
The scholarly efforts of many in the United States (including profes-
sors Rubin and Schlag) attest to the belief that jurisprudence is still
worth the effort.8 It is nonetheless important for us to note the pres-
ent disarray, because it explains why there is no predictably Ameri-
can response to a topic like "criteria for legal argument," why the
topic would occasion here responses differing in subject, form and
view.
What approach then should this Essay follow? Should I attempt
to catalogue and tie to our topic as many of the divergent develop-
ments here as possible? That cannot be done in the space allotted. 9
Should I forgo any attempt to create a general picture of jurispru-
dence in the United States and follow local practice by reacting to the
topic in my own particular way? While that might do for a solely
American audience, it would surely limit the informative value of the
Essay to participants at the International Congress.
The Essay attempts to escape this dilemma through a kind of
compromise. It examines an interesting, but largely unnoticed, phe-
nomenon that the author terms altruistic judicial argument. We will
try to consider this phenomenon by using the tools of law as a self-
contained discipline. We will find, however, that the systems and
proofs of law do not enable us to complete the closely related tasks set
out by this Essay of isolating altruistic argument, defining it,10 and
6. Rubin, "The New Legal Process: The Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microa-
nalysis of Institution," 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1343, 1343 (1996). "Any suggestion that
some new synthesis-or worse still, paradigm-is imminent would generally be re-
garded as naive." Id.
7. Schlag, "Normative and Nowhere to Go," 43 Stan. L. Rev. 167 (1990).
8. Professor Rubin urged "new synthesis" for legal scholarship in his article, and
Professor Schlag has continued his expansive if quixotic writing on legal theory and
culture. E.g., Schlag, "Law and Phrenology," 110 Harv. L. Rev. 877 (1997).
9. Moreover, many comprehensive studies already exist. See Duxbury, supra n.
3; Minda, supra n. 3; Rubin, supra n. 6; Schlag, supra n. 7.
10. That is, to state with some certainty what altruistic argument is and what it
is not. This relatively simple concept of definition serves in and outside the law. Cf.
Yagisawa, "Definition," appearing in the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 185
(Robert Audi, ed. 1995) (noting "if and only if' mode of "explicit definition").
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ascribing a theory of value to it.11 The Essay therefore enlists from
other disciplines the perspectives of rhetoric and pragmatism.
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part II examines the opinion writ-
ten in an 1827 American conflicts 12 case, Saul and His Creditors,1 3
which will provide our laboratory for the study of altruistic argu-
ment. Part III explores differences between lawyer argument and ju-
dicial argument, differentiates self-justifying and altruistic forms of
the latter, and suggests how Saul displays the virtues of altruistic
argument. Part III deploys logic and common sense in a critique con-
ventional to the discipline of law. Part IV evaluates Saul's altruism
differently, through the lenses of rhetoric and pragmatism.
For two reasons, the jurisprudential components of this Essay
are not completely assembled until Part IV. First, it is in keeping
with the earthbound verities of rhetoric and pragmatism,-the em-
phasis of both upon application and experience-that I first create for
them a practical setting. That is a function of Parts II and 111. 14 Sec-
ond, the sequence permits important questions about the need and
function of interdisciplinary critiques like rhetoric and pragmatism
in American jurisprudence. What problems can applications of the
two solve that could not be as easily solved through liberal applica-
tion of common sense?
II. SAUL AND His CREDITORS
The Louisiana appellate court in Saul faced the question
whether a marital couple shared equally property acquired by the
11. That is, at least a general idea of the difference between good and bad at-
tempts at altruistic argument.
12. This legal subject (also called in the United States "conflicts law," "conflict of
laws" and "choice of law") is frequently referred to abroad as "private international
law." American conflicts law may be defined as follows.
The purpose of conflicts law is to provide an intelligible and principled
basis for choosing a substantive rule (perhaps tort or contract) over the com-
peting rule of another place. Rules compete when their application would
lead to conflicting results and when the relation of each place to the contro-
versy is such that it is plausible for the rule of either place to govern. Con-
flicts law must legitimate the choice. It must explain why rejection of one law
in favor of another is right.
Shreve, "Conflicts Law-State or Federal?' 68 Ind. L. J. 907, 907 (1993).
13. 5 Mart. (n.s.) 569 (La. 1827).
14. Thus I follow in a small way the strategy used by Thomas Nagel in What Does
it All Mean?-A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy (1987). Professor Nagel dis-
cussed numerous problems of philosophy in this book without referring to philosophi-
cal works or using the terminology of the discipline. He justified his approach this
way.
The center of philosophy lies in certain questions which the human mind
finds naturally puzzling, and the best way to begin the study of philosophy is
to think about them directly. Once you've done that, you are in a better posi-





husband. The answer sought by the husband's creditors, and the an-
swer available under Virginia law, was no. The answer sought by the
children of the deceased wife, and available under Louisiana law, was
yes. 15 The couple had been married in Virginia. They had moved to
Louisiana many years before, and it was in Louisiana that the hus-
band acquired the disputed property. The court in Saul resolved the
conflict by choosing Louisiana law.
Saul apparently was not a case of first impression. Since prior
Louisiana predecent supported the choice of Louisiana law in Saul,
the case could have been disposed of with at most a perfunctory opin-
ion. But Judge Potter, writing for the court, refused this shortcut.
Issues raised in earlier cases had been reargued in Saul
with so much care by the counsel, and have received such
additional light from the laborious investigation bestowed on
them, that they come upon our consideration with as much
freshness, as if this was the only time our attention had been
drawn to them.16
Despite the energy and ability displayed by counsel, the court
found the issue before it difficult to resolve.
[T]he only question presented for our decision... grows out
of the conflict of laws of different states. Our former experi-
ence had taught us, that questions of this kind are the most
embarrassing and difficult of decision, that can occupy the
attention of those who preside in courts of justice. The argu-
ment of this case has shown us, that the vast mass of learn-
ing which the research of counsel has furnished, leaves the
subject as much enveloped in obscurity and doubt, as it
would have appeared to our own understanding, had we
15. Conflicts cases arise in the United States where choice is between domestic
law and that of a foreign country; however, the great majority of cases here, like Saul,
involve conflicts between the laws of sister states. This is because ours is a federal
rather than a unitary system. As I explained elsewhere,
[U]nder our federal system of government, states (rather than the national
government) create most of the substantive law governing civil actions in
state or lower federal courts. Moreover, while Congress or the Supreme
Court has power under the United States Constitution to reduce some or all
conflicts law to federal law, little of that power has been invoked. The conse-
quences of this situation... are that (1) conflicts choices for American courts
are usually intra-national (between local state law and that of another state),
and (2) choice is largely self-regulated.
Gene R. Shreve, A Conflict-of-laws Anthology 126-27 (1997).,
16. 5 Mart. at 570. Quotations from Saul retain the quirks of punctuation found
in the original.
Judge Potter's praise of the work of counsel appears warranted. Samuel
Livermore (attorney for the losing side) continued his conflicts research after the case,
publishing in 1828 the first American treatise on conflict of laws. See De Nova, "The
First American Book on Conflict of Laws," 8 Am. J. of Legal History 136 (1964).
19981
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
been called on to decide, without the knowledge of what
others had thought and written upon it.17
Judge Potter thereafter observed that the conflicts issue in Saul
presented
a subject, the most intricate and perplexed of any that has
occupied the attention of lawyers and courts: one on which
scarcely any two writers are found to entirely agree, and on
which, it is rare to find one consistent with himself through-
out. We know of no matter in jurisprudence so unsettled, or
none that should more teach men distrust for their own opin-
ions, and charity for those of others.18
Judge Potter later returned to the point.
When... so many ... men, of great talents and learning, are
thus found to fail in fixing certain principles, we are forced to
conclude that they have failed, not from want of ability, but
because the matter was not susceptible of being settled on
certain principles. 19
Despite these ruminations, Judge Potter did analyze at great
length the sources offered by counsel, including many European au-
thorities.20 In the end, the court rejected the creditor's argument
that a marital domicile in Virginia implied a marital contract gov-
erning property acquired after the couple relocated in Louisiana. This
1827 Louisiana case occupies an important place in our conflicts his-
tory. The learned and persuasive opinion by Judge Potter helped to
establish resistance in this country to the notion of implied premari-
tal contracts. Such was the influence of Saul that "it shaped the fu-
ture American marital property conflicts law."21
Yet the significance of Saul's choice-of-law ruling on marital
property22 will not detain us. The Essay will focus instead on the
passages from Saul quoted at length in this Part. They may at first
seem curious selections, for the passages do not contribute to the
holding in the case. They do not suggest or support (even indirectly)
any particular outcome in the case. The passages are not in any nor-
mal sense law. These very features, however, are what make the
passages useful to our study.
17. Id. at 571-72.
18. Id. at 589.
19. Id. at 595-96.
20. Id. at 576-608. This prompted Friedrich Juenger to observe that, on the
whole, "the opinion in Saul is a model of comparative research." Friedrich K. Juenger,
Choice of Law and Multistate Justice 28 (1992).
21. Juenger, "Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws: A Tale of Two Coun-
tries," 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1061, 1070 (1981).
22. For more on the continuing importance of this case, see Robert A. Leflar, Lu-
ther L. Mcdougal III & Robert L. Felix, American Conflicts Law 658 and n.6 (4th ed.




III. SAUL As ALTRUISTIC ARGUMENT
A. A First Attempt to Isolate and Define Altruistic Judicial
Argument
We usually associate argument in civil litigation with the work of
lawyers rather than of judges. Along with the functions of legal re-
search and factual investigation, argument makes up the essence of
the lawyer's role in United States litigation.23 For the most part,
however, lawyer argument is enslaved by partisan interests. Law-
yers purport to argue facts in the name of truth and to argue law for
the greater good. In reality, however, our "adversary system" usually
compels lawyers to select only those arguments that produce self-
serving (client-serving) consequences. 24
American judges argue too. Their judicial opinions can be under-
stood as written arguments-a higher, more attractive form of argu-
ment than that permitted lawyers in our system. Two successive
questions shape lawyer argument: What does my client want? What
is right about what my client wants? The object of lawyer argument
is to get what the 'client wants. A single question shapes judicial ar-
gument by opinion: What is right?25 The essential object of judicial
argument is to demonstrate why court (by its judgment or ruling) has
23. A basic feature of modern American procedure is the adversary system,
in which initiative and responsibility for presentation of the case rests pri-
marily with advocates on behalf of the parties. It is the function of the advo-
cate for the plaintiff to analyze the facts and legal basis if the grievance
which will be sued on; to select the appropriate legal concept for presenting
the case... ; to gather before trial the evidence to be presented in support of
the case; at trial, to present the evidence by questioning the appropriate wit-
nesses and offering relevant documents; and, at the conclusion of trial, to
argue to the trier of fact (judge or jury) that the evidence should lead to a
finding for plaintiff. The defense must anticipate the legal contentions and
the evidence to be offered by the plaintiff, and present countering evidence at
trial.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Michele Taruffo, American Civil Procedure-An Introduc-
tion 19-20 (1993). When cases are taken up on appeal, the lawyer's function of argu-
ment assumes central importance. See e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law
Tradition-Deciding Appeals 30-31 (1960).
24. Thus "It]he lawyer is expected to represent people who seek his help regard-
less of his opinion of the justice of their ends. *** [Wihenever he takes a case, he is not
considered responsible for his client's purposes." Simon, "The Ideology of Advocacy,"
1978 Wisc. L. Rev. 29, 36. Moreover, the lawyer's object "is not...to provoke thought
but rather to provoke closure." Wetlaufer, "Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Dis-
course," 76 Va. L. Rev. 1545, 1558 (1990). "[The lawyer is always right, and his adver-
sary is always wrong." Id.
25. This imagery reflects the "hands-on" attitude of American judges toward the
legal issues in their cases, an attitude that judges from civil code countries in Western
Europe, Latin American and elsewhere do not share.
The constitutional theory of the Civil Code reflects the political aspira-
tions of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. These aspirations
included the ideas that legal rules should be exclusively expressed in the
statutory pronouncements of the legislature, as the voice of the people. The
task of the courts is to ascertain the rules and apply them to specific cases;
the task of the advocates is to assist the judge in this ministerial task.
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said yes to the right litigant, how it has fulfilled its duty to dispense
justice under law.26 But since the court decides prior to writing the
opinion, the question shaping judicial argument might better be
termed: "Why is the court right?" The opinion is in that sense the
court's own legal brief. "It is the justification... for the court's decid-
ing the case as they have done."27
We are likely to find the traceries of this argument in every opin-
ion: (1) a legal rule directing the result in the case, (2) recitation of
case facts supporting the court's application of that rule, and (3) argu-
ment dismissing contrary rules (if any). We should find these ele-
ments of self-justification whenever the court attempts a written
opinion, 2s because justification succeeds only when the court demon-
The theory of the civil law system precludes judicial law making, even in
the guise of "interpretation," and it presumes that the truth in court is objec-
tively determinable and not merely a pragmatic choice between conflicting
versions.
Hazard and Taruffo, supra n. 23, at 20.
In the United States, separation-of-powers doctrine imposes some restraint on
judicial power (particularly as to statutes). Yet, compared to their colleagues in civil-
law countries, American judges enjoy enormous political independence to decide what
the law is and how it should be applied. See Hart, "American Jurisprudence Through
English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream," 11 Ga. L. Rev. 969, 970 (1977)
(noting "the quite extraordinary role that the courts, above all the United States
Supreme Court, play in American government."). A number of features have been
offered to explain or exemplify the relative autonomy of American courts. They in-
clude their power to nullify legislative enactments (Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy
in America v. 1, pp. 104-07 (Vintage ed. 1954); Frankfurter, "John Marshall and the
Judicial Function," 69 Harv. L. Rev. 229 (1955)); acceptance of American judicial deci-
sions as reflections of community values (Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law
17 (1977)); Robert E. Keeton, Judging 53-54 (1990)); and the common-law tradition in
the United States (G. Edward White, The American Judicial Tradition 37 (1976);
Tony Freyer, Harmony & Dissonance; The Swift and Erie Cases in American Federal-
ism (1981)).
26. A result may be presented as right for substantive reasons (stressing notions
like duty, freedom or accountability) or for reasons of procedure (stressing where,
when or how particular arguments should be made). The interplay of substance and
procedure has been a favorite theme in American law and legal commentary. See e.g.,
Carrington, "'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Rules Enabling Act," 1989 Duke L. J.
281; Cook, "'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws," 42 Yale L. J. 333
(1933); Cooper, "Statutes of Limitation in Minnesota Choice of Law: The Problematic
Return of the Substance-Procedure Distinction," 71 Minn. L. Rev. 363 (1986); McClin-
tock, "Distinguishing Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws," 78 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 933 (1930).
27. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush-On Our Law and Its Study 37 (1930).
[T]he judge has a number of audiences she must persuade that she is right
and that the losing party's lawyer is wrong. The audiences include the appel-
late courts, the legal community, the losing party (who the judge hopes will
leave the courtroom quietly and decide not to appeal the case), and the public
at large. At this point, the judge has a series of client-like commitments-to
her own decision, to her reputation for getting matters right, to the winning
party, and to the reputation of courts and the rule of law.
Wetlaufer, supra n. 24, at 1561.
28. However, realities of the American judicial process make it impossible either
to suggest that written opinions invariably accompany judicial rulings, or to suggest
that all of the opinions that one does find have well-developed justifying argument.
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strates that it has found the rule appropriate to resolve the case at
hand and others like it.29 Once the court has thus argued its defense
against the charge of erroneous decision, the opinion may (and often
does) stop.
Or the opinion may exhibit additional, nonessential forms of ar-
gument. It may, for example, discuss other, theoretical applications
of a rule adopted or rejected by the court's decision, or it may offer
material that does not directly support the court's decision but does
suggest that the court is generally following a desirable course. Ar-
gument that is not essential to the court's particular decision but that
compliments that decision in ways noted above is frequently termed
"dictum,"30 to separate it from argument that directly explains (sup-
ports) the court's decision, termed "holding." This is a time-honored
distinction in American law, if not always easy to apply.31 But the
To be valid, judgments or interlocutory rulings by American courts need not be
accompanied by written opinions. Trial courts may follow their judgments with writ-
ten opinions, but they are usually obliged to prepare only a truncated document often
called "findings of fact and conclusions of law." See e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
American appellate courts are more apt to accompany their rulings with written
opinions, but today these may be so-called unpublished opinions. Rules governing un-
published opinions often restrict their public examination and discussion. See e.g.,
Reynolds & Richman, "An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States
Courts of Appeals," 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 573 (1981). The function of these opinions as
argument is therefore in some doubt.
29. The established view here is that a successful judicial opinion must explain
why the same result would occur in a category of like cases. Golding, "Principled
Decision-Making and the Supreme Court," 63 Colum. L. Rev. 35 (1963); Levi, "An
Introduction to Legal Reasoning," 15 U. Chi. L. Rev. 501, 501-02 (1948); Murry, "The
Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning," 29 UCLA L. Rev. 833 (1982); Winston, "On
Treating Like Cases Alike," 62 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1974).
30. Numerous examples appear in Wald, "The Rhetoric of Results and the Results
of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings," 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1371, 1408-10 (1995).
31. Cf. Henry J. Abraham, The Judicial Process 236 (4th ed. 1980) (holding "con-
stitutes the legal rule to be followed and adhered to; [dictum] is an expression of a
belief, viewpoint, or sentiment, which, at least in theory, has no binding effect.").
Judicial dicta has been important in the development of American law. At the
same time, its nonessential status in judicial opinions has led to doubts about the
authority and even the desirability of dicta. These doubts are due to the nature of
American judicial power. Our judiciary's considerable political authority (including
the power to invalidate legislation) rests on the notion that a court must be able to
determine all the law necessary to decide the case at hand (see Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803), the discussion of Marbury in this context in Alexander M.
Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 114-16 (1962); and a discussion of the point gen-
erally in James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and
Reconstitutions of Language, Character, and Community 264 (1984)). The rationale
for judicial authority just discussed validates judicial holdings but leaves dicta in
limbo.
Thus, even some of those on the United State Supreme Court who made the best
use dicta (Chief Justice John Marshall, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, and Justice
Robert Jackson) were at times wary of the device. Marshall authored Marbury.
Holmes wrote: "General propositions do not decide concrete cases." Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905). Jackson wrote: "It is timely again to remind counsel
that words of our opinions are to be read in the light of the facts of the case under
discussion. * * * General expressions transposed to other facts are often misleading."
Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 132 (1944).
1998]
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traditional holding\dictum distinction does not really account for a
less common form of judicial argument: where a court's interest in
justifying its decision is overcome by a broader desire to promote the
law and its good effects. This happened in Judge Potter's opinion.
The passages from Saul appearing in Part II make clear that
Judge Potter was interested in much more than merely defending the
court's ruling, for these passages do not even intimate how the court
will rule. But, in a sense important to this Essay, the passages are
better for that. We have noted that judicial argument is generally
superior to lawyer argument because the concern of the latter is for
what is right. In a similar vein, judicial argument in defense of the
court's ruling may be on a lower plane from argument unrelated to
the question whether the court decided the case correctly.
This is not to suggest that the former is less important. The
point is that, as proper and central to the opinion as argument de-
fending the decision may be, it is self-interested, almost compulsory,
argument. Judicial dicta in the conventional sense, described earlier,
is self-serving as well.32 With either, the court is trying to persuade
the reader that it acted legitimately.33 By comparison, argument in-
different to the result is voluntary and perhaps altruistic. As in Saul,
the writer is simply moved to express his or her feelings about law
and those who must use it or live under it.
B. Altruistic Argument Illustrated in Saul
At least three altruistic arguments appear from the portions of
Saul identified in Part II. (1) Conflict of laws is a subject meriting
careful research and argument by counsel 34 and strenuous analysis
and deliberation by courts. 35 (2) Yet, even with such effort, the sub-
ject of conflicts law remains so complicated and confusing that courts
must wonder whether any entirely reassuring solutions may be
found.3 6 (3) There is thus a need for empathy and solidarity within
the community of commentators, courts and counsel who struggle
with conflicts problems.37
Saul demonstrates the potential of altruistic judicial argument.
The court's statements are remarkably visionary, anticipating the
crisis today in choice of law. The court's argument is also remarkable
32. The conventional understanding of dictum is that, by alluding to features
unilluminated by the actual controversy, it argues for the court's decision in a looser
sense. See e.g., Joyce J. George, Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook 245-46 (3rd ed.
1993); Samuel Mermin, Law and the Legal System-An Introduction 289-91 (2nd ed.
1982); Comment, "Dictum Revisited," 2 Stan. L. Rev. 509 (1952).
33. In this sense, which is all-important to the Essay, the traditional hold-
ing\dictum distinction provides no useful distinction in fact.
34. Supra n. 16 and accompanying text.
35. Supra n. 20 and accompanying text.
36. Supra nn. 17-19 and accompanying text.
37. Supra n. 18 and accompanying text.
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for being entirely right. Saul justifiably attacks the two most perni-
cious ideas now afflicting American conflicts law: (1) that the field is
too troubled to reward either serious research and careful argument
by attorneys or strenuous analysis and deliberation by courts; and (2)
that particular choice-of-law rules or approaches are entirely correct,
while others are entirely incorrect-viz, difficulties exist in American
conflicts law only because certain people are wrong and do not admit
it.
It is possible to find numerous expressions of the first idea, that
conflicts law is in a troubled, perhaps hopeless state. If the views of
commentators, 38 judges, 39 and attorneys40 are indicative, it remains
one of the most confusing and unpopular subjects of American law.
But Saul dispels the first idea, as well as the second, that there are
clearly right and wrong answers in the conflicts debate, 41 by insisting
that conflicts law deserves to be taken quite seriously even though the
subject is innately difficult and may never yield entirely satisfactory
answers. Thus, in the high point of the opinion, Judge Potter urges
that the legal community (instead of disdaining conflicts law as too
38. Professor William Prosser described conflicts law as "a dismal swamp, filled
with quaking quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who theo-
rize about mysterious matters in strange and incomprehensible jargon." "Interstate
Publication," 51 Mich. L. Rev. 959, 971 (1953). For a rejection of the field almost as
sweeping, see Sterk, "The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory," 142 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 949 (1994).
Some critics do not completely reject conflicts law would nonetheless abolish its
current form and substance as common law, either by absorbing it into various parts
of the United States Constitution, e.g., Ely, "Choice of Law and the State's Interest in
Protecting Its Own," 23 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 173 (1981); Laycock, "Equal Citizens of
Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law," 92
Colum. L. Rev. 249 (1992), or into federal statutes, e.g., Gottesman, "Draining the
Dismal Swamp: the Case for Federal Choice of Law Statues," 80 Geo. L. J. 1 (1991);
Kane, "Drafting Choice of Law Rules for Complex Litigation: Some Preliminary
Thoughts," 10 Rev. Litig. 309 (1991).
39. In Erwin v. Thomas, 506 P.2d 494, 495 (1973), the Oregon Supreme Court
stated: "It is with some trepidation that a court enters a maze of choice of law in torts
cases. No two authorities agree." The court likened use of one of the competing con-
flicts approaches to "wandering off into the jungle with a compass which everyone but
its maker says is defective." Similar views appear in In re Paris Air Crash of Mar. 3,
1974, 399 F.Supp. 732, 739 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (conflicts law is a "Veritable jungle, which,
if the law can be found out, leads not to a 'rule of action' but a reign of chaos."), and in
Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550, 553 (W.Va. 1986) (conflicts law is "cumbersome
and unwieldy [creating] confusion, uncertainty and inconsistency, as well as compli-
cation of the judicial task.").
40. "Many lawyers regard modern choice-of-law analysis as a confusing morass."
Singer, "A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts," 70 B. U. L. Rev. 731, 731 (1990).
41. Most features of contemporary American conflicts law are objects of vociferous
and intractable debate by conflicts scholars, a chronic state of affairs examined at
length in Shreve, supra n. 15, at 85-152,.and summarized in Shreve, "Notes From the
Eye of the Storm," 48 Mercer L. Rev. 823 (1997). "There is now in our conflicts litera-
ture such an disparate, often contradictory, accretion of policies, rules, systems, catch-
phrases, diagnoses, and proposed cures that it seems almost impossible for theorists
now writing to demonstrate with complete success how their ideas are new, helpful, or
even intelligible." Id. at 828.
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troubled or difficult) approach the subject with compassion and soli-
darity. "We know of no matter in jurisprudence so unsettled, or none
that should more teach men distrust for their own opinions, and char-
ity for those of others."42
C. An Interdisciplinary Turn
With Saul as its laboratory, the Essay has made some progress
in isolating, defining, and giving value to altruistic judicial argument.
We have separated argument entirely disconnected from the court's
decision from argument defending that decision directly or indirectly.
Everything in the judicial opinion is argument in the public interest.
It follows that disconnected material in the opinion speaks to the
public interest in a more general, undifferentiated sense. That is, all
such material is at least an attempt at altruistic argument. Moreover,
the attractive features of Saul suggest intuitively that the case illus-
trates not merely the attempt but the realization of altruistic
argument.
But, because we still lack a theory of value for altruistic argu-
ment, it is difficult either to articulate what is good or desirable in
Saul, or differentiate more generally good from bad attempts at altru-
istic argument. Without a theory of value-a normative instrument
to illuminate and justify the purpose of altruistic argument-we can-
not make further headway in understanding the phenomenon. And,
42. 5 Mart. at 589. The court's approach is in line with two contemporary at-
tempts to account for both mind and feeling in choice of law. The first is by Professor
Arthur T. von Mehren.
Those who work in the field of choice of law are, at times, discouraged by
the apparently intractable nature of the problems with which they must
grapple. Intricate and subtle analyses are undertaken; ambiguities and un-
certainties are painfully resolved. Ultimately, a result is reached, yet the so-
lution is too frequently neither entirely satisfying nor fully convincing.
The process of analyzing and deciding fully domestic cases is, of course,
on occasion also difficult and the results reached are at times unsatisfying.
Yet, overall, one is ordinarily less dissatisfied than with multistate cases.
The deeper and more pervasive malaise engendered by these latter flows only
partly from the relatively greater complexity of the analysis typically re-
quired; even where wholly domestic cases present a comparable order of diffi-
culty, the solutions given in multistate cases are more likely to trouble one's
sense of justice.
von Mehren, "Choice of Law and the Problem of Justice," 41 Law and Contemp. Probs.
27, 27 (1977). The second is by the author.
Conflicts law is far from perfect. However, particular flaws have less to do
with its unpopularity than one might think. Rather, it is the innate difficul-
ties of analysis that have made conflicts controversial and have kept it that
way. It may be a sad fact of human nature that the difficulty of a legal ques-
tion is demonstrated less by agreement on that score among judges and com-
mentators than by the rising decibel level of arguments over who is obviously
right and obviously wrong. The prevailing approach to resolving conflicts-
whatever that approach then happens to be-will always be under attack.
Shreve, supra n. 12, at 911-12.
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to search for a theory of value for altruistic argument, we must alter
our approach.
We have used thus far a lawyer-like mode of investigation. 43 Yet
it is revealing to note that our progress has actually been unaided by
the law's own rules or arrangements. The law in fact takes no notice
of altruistic argument as such. Arguments to the contrary do not
withstand close examination.
To argue, for example, that law has provided the category of dic-
tum for altruistic argument, merely illustrates the maxim: "what the
legal system cannot answer it organizes."44 For dictum is conven-
tionally understood in the law to be precisely what altruistic argu-
ment is not-justification of the court's decision (albeit in diluted
form).45 It is similarly unsound to suggest that the law's negative
valuation of dictum 46 is a valuation of altruistic argument. The lat-
ter probably shares some of the faults of conventional dictum 47 but
not others.48 Most important, there is no evaluation in holding/dic-
tum distinction or elsewhere in the law of the selfless and civic im-
pulse reflected in altruistic judicial argument.
Saul appears to be proof that altruistic argument is capable of
occurring unrecognized. Since altruistic judicial argument does oc-
cur, however, it would be particularly helpful if our legal discipline
spoke to the phenomenon. And if our initial sense is that there may
be something beneficial about altruistic argument, perhaps the legal
community should consider recognizing and encouraging it.49 That
43. Our critique of altruistic argument has progressed by applications of logic and
common sense in line with the "special fascination" here "among lawyers and judges
with their own behavior, their own processes of thought." Freund, "An Analysis of
Judicial Reasoning," appearing in Law and Philosophy 282 (Sidney Hook, ed. 1964).
44. Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert S. Redmount, Lawyers, Law Students and People
7 (1977).
45. See supra n. 30 and accompanying text.
46. E.g., Judicial Opinion Writing Manual 14 (American Bar Association 1991)
("dictum is rarely of value"); George, supra n. 32, at 143 ("dicta.. .should be avoided").
47. Like conventional dicta, altruistic arguments add to the length of judicial
opinions, and excessive length is a concern. E.g., Ruggero J. Aldisert, Opinion Writing
271-75 (1990); Federal Judicial Center, Judicial Writing Manual 23 (1991); Beards-
ley, "Judicial Draftsmanship," 24 Wash. L. Rev. 146 (1949). And because altruistic
arguments (like conventional dicta) are not part of the holding, the authority for
American courts to make them is less secure. See supra n. 31.
48. Recall that, unlike altruistic argument, conventional dictum is a roundabout
way of rearguing the correctness of the court's decision. Because it is so near the
holding in form and function, conventional dictum suffers by comparison. It is
thought to be wasteful per se, vague in its untethered pronouncements of law, and at
times confusingly like the holding in appearance. See Comment, "Dictum Revisited,"
2 Stan. L. Rev. 509 (1952); Sarnoffv. American Homes Products Corp., 798 F.2d 1075,
1084 (1986) (per Posner, J.).
Cf. Wald, supra n. 30, at 1410 ("one judge's dicta may be another judge's coherent
rationale" for the decision).
49. What form that might take is not, for present purposes, very important. It
might simply be a change in the attitude and judicial practice that makes the rule and
policies of the current holding\dictum distinction important.
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could be done. After a period of assimilation, altruistic argument
would be as naturally a part of our legal tradition as the hold-
ing\dictum distinction that it would modify.
The problem is that full evaluation of the law reform issue,
whether to rework the holding \ dictum distinction to create a discrete
place for altruistic argument, is impossible if limited to the precincts
of law as an autonomous discipline.50 Referring only to itself, law
would not find in its rules, habits, and attitudes justification for this
change. In other words, there is nothing within the law from which to
construct a theory of value for altruistic argument. And, with no
means of demonstrating its desirability, altruistic argument could
never gain recognition in the law.
So we have two related problems. First, we are stalled in the pro-
cess of isolating and defining altruistic argument. Saul invites
thought about the reality and desirability of altruistic argument, but
we need a theory of value for altruistic argument to continue our in-
vestigation. We cannot develop such a theory without concrete nor-
mative help from some quarter, and the law offers none. Second,
contemplation of altruistic argument is more useful if we can at least
imagine the possibility of its recognition in the law. But the law offers
nothing to justify such a reform. Again, we feel the lack of a theory of
value.
If we confine our investigation to the discipline of law, we may
have reached a dead end. But material that would permit a theory of
value for altruistic argument (and consequently support a case for
law reform) may exist outside the law-within the systems, proofs
and defining traditions of a nonlegal discipline. Can we find help else-
where? Let us see by consulting the traditions of rhetoric and
pragmatism. 51
50. The viability of this concept is now a matter of debate. In his famous defense
of law as an autonomous discipline, Professor Charles Fried concludes:
The law's rationality is a rationality apart. Is that a scandal? Why? We can
teach it and students can learn it. We can recognize better and worse exam-
ples of it. When we say of a judge or lawyer that he is learned in the law, we
assume that there is a body of knowledge to be learned in, and that such
learning increases wisdom, judgment, and justice.
Fried, "The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know," 60 Texas L. Rev.
35, 58 (1981). For the opposing view, see Posner, "The Decline of Law as an Autono-
mous Discipline: 1962-1987," 100 Harv. L. Rev. 761 (1987).
51. The Essay for convenience refers to pragmatism as a discipline, although it
might be more accurate to refer to it as a school or subdiscipline of philosophy.
While time and page constraints make it difficult to discuss even these two nonle-
gal disciplines, investigation under more than two would actually be helpful. For ex-
ample, perspectives on reading literature would bear on the way in which the Essay
interprets the passages from Saul presented in Part II. Examples from the law and
literature movement include Theodore Ziolkowski, The Mirror of Justice-Literary
Reflections of Legal Crises (1997); Martha C. Nussbaum, Poetic Justice-The Literary
Imagination and Public Life (1995); Interpreting Law and Literature-a Hermeneutic
Reader (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux, eds. 1988); James B. White, The Legal
Imagination-Studies in the Nature of Legal Thought and Expression (1973). Simi-
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IV. RHETORIC, PRAGMATISM, AND THE VALUE OF ALTRUISTIC
JUDICIAL ARGUMENT
A. Uses of Rhetoric and Pragmatism in This Essay
(1) Rhetoric
An ancient topic, the meaning of "rhetoric" has changed over
time.52 "But whatever the particular definition, the term has been
applied to the use of language (or of special kinds of language) for the
moving, pleasing, or persuading of readers or auditors to specific
judgments, decisions, or actions." 53 Rhetoric, writes Thomas Farrell,
"is the collaborative art of addressing and guiding decision and judg-
ment-usually public judgment about matters that cannot be decided
by force or expertise." Farrell explains that for society rhetoric "is an
institutional formation in which motives of competing parties are in-
telligible, audiences available, expressions reciprocal, norms trans-
latable, and silences noticeable." 54
From the beginnings of rhetoric as a discipline, its affinity with
law has been clear.55 Explaining the matter in contemporary terms,
Professor H.L.A. Hart stated:
larly, the Essay would probably benefit from a historical perspective on Saul and on
the life and times of Judge Potter. On the nature and potential of historiography in
legal criticism, see Symposium, "The Critical Use of History," 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1021(1997); G. Edward White, Intervention and Detachment-Essays in Legal History and
Jurisprudence (1994).
52. Since the time of Greek antiquity, the definition of "rhetoric" has changed
from century to century as the idea of "rhetoric" has been expanded to cover
the whole of the art, or contracted to include only a part. Generally, idea and
definition-responding to the political or intellectual uses to which the art
was put-have moved from considerations of language to the arguments or
the passions expressed by language, to the effects produced by rhetorical
compositions, to the relationships between such compositions and abstract
concepts ("truth" or "justice"); then back to language.
Weinberg, "Rhetoric After Plato," appearing in Dictionary of the History of Ideas
(Philip P. Weiner, ed., vol. IV 167 1973).
53. Id. See generally George A. Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric
(1994) (Greek and Roman foundations of rhetoric); Thomas M. Conley, Rhetoric in the
European Tradition (1990) (receptions of rhetoric in Europe); and American Rhetoric:
Context and Criticism (Thomas W. Benson, ed. 1989) (receptions of rhetoric in the
United States).
The growing importance of rhetoric here has been described as follows.
Renewed interest in rhetoric has surfaced in a wide range of conferences and
publications across several academic disciplines. * * * Besides the rapid
growth of such rhetorically oriented fields as Composition Studies, several
other disciplines have been significantly affected by the "rhetorical turn" in
the humanities and social sciences, for example, philosophy, law, literary
theory, cultural studies, anthropology, sociology, political science, speech
communication, and even economics.
Mailloux, "Sophistry and Rhetorical Pragmatism," appearing in Rhetoric, Sophistry,
Pragmatism 1 (Steven Mailloux, ed. 1995).
54. Thomas B. Farrell, Norms of Rhetorical Culture 1 (1993).
55. In the fifth century Greece, private property litigation in Syracuse inspired
the first system of rhetoric, rhetoric grew in importance in Athenian courts, and
scenes approximating legal argument were frequently used as rhetorical devices in
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The connection between law and the study of argument-
rhetoric in the old non-pejorative sense of that word-
is. . .clear. Legal reasoning characteristically depends on
precedent and analogy, and makes an appeal less to univer-
sal logical principles than to certain basic assumptions pecu-
liar to the lawyer; it therefore offers the clearest and perhaps
most instructive example of modes of persuasion which are
rational and yet not in the logical sense conclusive. 56
Commentators have reached a variety of conclusions about the appli-
cation and value of rhetoric to legal theory. 57 Much of the recent
legal literature, however, shares Farrell's emphasis on the social im-
portance of rhetoric. The trend has been termed "communitarian re-
vivalism."58 It is in this sense that rhetoric is important to the essay.
(2) Pragmatism
Pragmatism emerged before the beginning of this century as an
American philosophical movement,59 and "[i]t is primarily as a move-
Greek literature. Kennedy, supra n. 53, at 11-16. "Republican Rome shared the
Greek interest in debate and legal argument, and therefore considered rhetoric essen-
tial to public life." McArthur, "Rhetoric," appearing in the Oxford Companion to the
English Language 865 (Tom McArthur, ed. 1992).
56. Hart, "Introduction," appearing in Ch. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the
Problem of Argument vii (1963).
57. See, e.g., Posner, "Judges Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?)," 62 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1421 (1996); The Rhetoric of Law (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, eds.
1994); Wald, supra n. 30; Richard H. Gaskins, Burdens of Proof in Modern Discourse
(1992); Wetlaufer, supra n. 24; James Boyd White, Heracles' Bow-Essays on the
Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law (1985). A valuable survey of the uses of rhetoric in
legal literature appears in Sarat & Kearns, id. at 1-27.
58. Goodrich, "Antirrhesis: Polemical Structures of Common Law Thought," ap-
pearing in Sarat & Kearns, supra n. 58, at 59. Goodrich, while not an adherent of this
movement, describes it thus:
[Rhetoric's] practical value to the study of law is almost universally perceived
to be resident in its capacity to produce agreement. * * * Rhetoric will return
language to nature, eloquence to the institution, and community to law.
Rhetoric will not only save law from the specter of nihilistic indeterminancies
of interpretation but will equally return the art of judgment to its proper
ethical parameters as a genre of civil speech.
Id. at 57-58.
59. Leading figures in the development of pragmatism included Charles Sanders
Peirce, William James, John Dewey, C.I. Lewis, and George Herbert Mead. Studies of
individual philosophers and their work include John K. Sheriff, Charles Peirce's
Guess at the Riddle (1994); Joseph Brent, Charles Sanders Peirce-a Life (1993);
Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism-Essays by Max H. Fisch (Kenneth Laine Ketner
& Christian J.W. Kloesel, eds. 1986); W. B. Gallie, Peirce and Pragmatism (1966);
Gerald E. Myers, Williams James-His Life and Thought (1986); Ralph Barton Perry,
In the Spirit of William James (1938); Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Charac-
ter of William James (2 vols., 1935); James Campbell, Understanding John Dewey
(1995); Robert B. Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy (1991); The Phi-
losophy of John Dewey (Paul Arthur Schlipp & Lewis Edwin Hahn, eds., 3d ed. 1989);
R.W. Sleeper, The Necessity of Pragmatism-John Dewey's Conception of Philosophy
(1986); Morton White, The Origins of Dewey's Instrumentalsim (1943); Sidney Hook,
John Dewey-An Intellectual Portrait (1939); "C.I. Lewis Commemorative Sympo-
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ment rather than by any one doctrine that pragmatism is best under-
stood."60 The philosophical community never arrived at a settled
definition of "pragmatism. '61 Nor have legal scholars been able to
agree what they mean when they appropriate pragmatism. 62 Nor
have scholars been able to agree whether or how pragmatism in legal
theory differs from philosophical pragmatism.63 Yet it is possible to
sium," 61 J. Phil. 545 (1964); Hans Joas, G.H. Mead-A Contemporary Re-examina-
tion of His Thought (1985).
General accounts of pragmatism as a philosophical movement include Paul K.
Conklin, Puritans & Pragmatists 193-402 (1968); Elizabeth Flower & Murray G. Mur-
phy, A History of Philosophy in America, Vol. II 567-692, 811-958, 965-72 (1977);
Bruce Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy 104-26, 159-79, 533-62; H.S. Thayer,
Meaning in Action: a Genealogy of Pragmatism (1989); Morton White, Pragmatism
and the American Mind (1973); Philip P. Weiner, Evolution and the Founders or Prag-
matism (1949).
American pragmatists never claimed to have originated the ideas and system of
pragmatist thought. William James actually entitled one of his books Pragmatism-A
New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (1907). Features of pragmatism were an-
ticipated, for example, in teachings of the Greek sophists (Frederick Copleston, A His-
tory of Philosophy, Book One 95 (1985)) and in Aristotle's concept of practical wisdom
(E.S. Hutchinson, "Ethics," appearing in the Cambridge Companion to Aristotle 207
(Jonathan Barnes, ed. 1995)).
60. Thayer, "Introduction," appearing in Pragmatism: The Classic Writings 11 (H.
S. Thayer, ed. 1970).
61. A pragmatist recently observed: "I do not think of pragmatism as a set of doc-
trines or even as a method." Richard J. Bernstein, The New Constellation: the Ethical-
Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity 324 (1993). In the same vein, Philip P.
Weiner noted a 1908 study by Arthur 0. Lovejoy that identified thirteen different
(and to an extent conflicting) meanings of pragmatism. Lovejoy's study, explained
Weiner,
raised the problem of whether there was any coherent core of ideas that could
define the doctrine or movement that was so widely discussed by American
and European thinkers in various disciplines. Certainly Charles S. Peirce
and William James (who credited Peirce in 1897 with inventing the doctrine)
had divergent ideas in their "pragmatic" theories of truth. There were also
divergences among those writers in the United States and abroad who de-
fended their own particular versions of pragmatism.
Weiner, "Pragmatism," appearing in Dictionary of the History of Ideas, vol. III 551
(Philip P. Weiner, ed. 1973).
62. Over the past twenty years, legal scholars have frequently discussed applica-
tions of philosophical pragmatism in legal theory. E.g., Baker, "'Just Do It': Pragma-
tism and Progressive Social Change," 78 Va. L. Rev. 697 (1992); Grey, "Holmes and
Legal Pragmatism," 41 Stan. L. Rev. 787 (1989); Patterson, "Law's Pragmatism: Law
as Practice and Narrative," 76 Va. L. Rev. 937 (1990); Posner, supra n. 4, at 454-69;
Smith, "The Pursuit of Pragmatism," 100 Yale L. J. 409 (1990); Stick, "Can Nihilism
Be Pragmatic?," 100 Harv. L. Rev. 332 (1986); Summers, "Pragmatic Instrumentalism
in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought-A Synthesis and Critique of Our
Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Use," 66 Cornell L. Rev. 861 (1981);
For examples of the converse, pragmatist philosophers writing about law, see
Dewey, "Logical Method and Law," 10 Cornell L. Q. 17 (1927); Rorty, "The Banality of
Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice," 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1811 (1990); Putnam, "Are
Moral Values Made or Discovered?," 1 Legal Theory 5 (1995).
63. For recent attempts to differentiate the two, see Posner, "Pragmatic Adjudica-
tion," 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1 (1996); Grey, "Freestanding Legal Pragmatism," 18 Car-
dozo L. Rev. 21 (1996); Rosenfeld, "Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Legal Interpretation:
Posner's and Rorty's Justice Without Metaphysics Meets Hate Speech," 18 Cardozo L.
Rev. 97, 103-10 (1996).
1998]
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
come up with a brief, twofold understanding of pragmatism that will
serve this Essay.
First, the core:
The characteristic idea of philosophical pragmatism is that
efficacy in practical application-the issue of 'which works
out most effectively'-somehow provides a 'standard for the
determination of truth in the case of statements, rightness
in the case of actions, and value in the case of appraisals.64
Many embellishments to this core definition of pragmatism
might be possible.65 One, pragmatism's mediating and healing
properties, provides the second and concluding part of the Essay's un-
derstanding of the term. I have previously offered the idea of media-
tion in suggesting how pragmatism can be a powerful instrument for
understanding and improving law. I argued that pragmatism can
function at the far reaches of discourse about the meaning and value
of law, to clarify and mediate forces of nonpragmatist thought. My
thesis was that, while pragmatism in legal theory can be far more
than a commonplace reminder to be sensible, pragmatism by its
terms is not a competitive legal theory. It is thus unlike natural law,
positivism or historical jurisprudence. Pragmatism may be as impor-
tant as these grand theories, but (in a way unique to pragmatism) it
is important only because of other theories. This is a communitarian,
pluralistic role for pragmatism. Pragmatism is a citizen, so to speak,
with a mission to test, clarify, and mediate impulses generated else-
where within a larger community of ideas.66
64. Rescher, "Pragmatism," appearing in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy
710 (Ted Honderich, ed. 1995). It is possible to describe pragmatism in legal theory at
about the same level of generality:
First, it conceives the primary task of legal theory to be the provision of a
coherent body of ideas about law which will made law more valuable in the
hands of officials .... Second [it takes the view] that legal rules and other
forms of law are most essentially tools devised to serve practical
ends .... Third, [it focuses] on the instrumental facets of legal phenomena,
including: the nature, variety, and complexity of the goals the law may serve;
law's implementive machinery; the kinds of means-goal relationships in the
law; the variety of legal tasks that officials must fulfill to translate law into
practice, the efficacy of law; and its limits.
Robert S. Summers, Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory 20 (1982).
65. Various refinements of and additions to the basic idea of pragmatism repre-
sented in the text appear in three collections. "Symposium: The Revival of Pragma-
tism," 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1 (1996); Pragmatism in Law & Society, (Michael Brint &
William Weaver, eds. 1991); "Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in
American Legal Thought," 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1569 (1990).
66. Shreve, "Symmetries of Access in Civil Rights Litigation: Politics, Pragma-
tism and Will," 66 Ind. L. J. 1, 31-37, 50-52 (1990). Cf. Grey, supra n. 63, at 37-38
("pragmatists argue that the grand theories, if understood as partial perspectives, do
not cancel each other out, but rather that each of them has something to contribute to
the understanding of law.").
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This rendering of pragmatism is compatible with the general ap-
proach of contemporary pragmatists (neopragmatists67). Sandra Ro-
senthal's recent construction of pragmatism provides an example.68
At the same time, the capacity of pragmatism to clarify and mediate
the clash of ideas was first and fully explained by John Dewey. And
it is upon Dewey's approach that I shall chiefly rely.
B. Can Rhetoric and Pragmatism Help Us Develop a Theory of
Value for Altruistic Argument?
(1) Rhetorical and Pragmatist Readings of Saul
We must remember that to call Judge Potter's work altruistic ar-
gument is to make two representations. The first is that he attempted
altruistic argument. The second is that the attempt was successful.
We have already noted why all statements in a judicial opinion
wholly unrelated to the decision are at least attempts at altruistic
argument. The contributions of rhetoric and pragmatism will be to
sharpen the distinction between good and bad attempts.
The affinity between rhetoric and pragmatism has been noted69
and will become evident later when the two perspectives converge in
this Essay. Let us begin, however, by noting how each contributes
separately to our understanding of altruistic argument in Saul. Re-
call the gist of that argument. Conflicts law is a subject that merits
67. While their predecessors distrusted propositions that could not be veri-
fied pragmatically, neopragmatists incline toward pluralism. This shift is
due in large part to the tendency of first-generation pragmatists to exagger-
ate scientific method's capacity to clarify matters of rational belief and justifi-
cation. Neopragmatists are wary of scientific method and attempt more
diffuse applications of pragmatism.
Shreve, supra n. 66, at 29 (citations omitted).
Today's neopragmatists include Richard Rorty, Hillary Putnam, and Richard
Bernstein. See, e.g., Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (1982); Hilary Put-
nam, Pragmatism (1995); Richard J. Bernstein, Philosophical Profiles-Essays in a
Pragmatic Mode (1986); Richard J. Bernstein, The New Constellation (1992).
68. Sandra B. Rosenthal, Speculative Pragmatism (1986). Professor Rosenthal
undertakes a "speculative synthesis" of the doctrines advanced by Peirce, James,
Dewey, Lewis, and Mead. Id. at 3. In a passage close in spirit to the second idea of
pragmatism offered in the text, Rosenthal explains how her conception of speculative
pragmatism meets an important challenge to philosophy.
[lilt must offer not just a system based on the evidence it sees, but it must
account for the fact that the different philosophies differ as to what consti-
tutes the nature of evidence. It must offer not just a theory of truth, but it
must account for the fact that different philosophies differ as to what consti-
tutes the nature of truth. It must offer not just foundations, but it must ac-
count for the fact that different philosophies differ concerning the very
foundations of philosophy. It must be not just another system in conflict, but it
must account for the fact that there can be systems in conflict.
Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
69. Mailloux, "Introduction," appearing in Rhetoric, Sophistry, Pragmatism 1-3
(Steven Mailloux, ed. 1995); John Patrick Diggins, The Promise of Pragmatism-Mod-
ernism and the Crisis of Knowledge and Authority 3 (1994); Thomas M. Conley, Rheto-
ric in the European Tradition 7 (1990); Perelman, supra n. 56.
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our serious attention, even when it does not yield satisfactory an-
swers in application. We must therefore leaven our hard work on
conflicts with patience and respect for the work of others.
What distracted Judge Potter from the customary practice of
self-justification and caused him to argue for the sake of conflicts law
and all in society affected by it? I believe he was practicing what
James Boyd White has called "constitutive rhetoric," that is, "the cen-
tral art by which culture and community are established, main-
tained, and transformed."70  We deal with notions that are also
important elsewhere. The influence of the concept of community in
legal theory-extends beyond law and rhetoric scholarship. 71 And
rhetoric's applications to the law extend beyond the judicial argu-
ment.72 But the rhetorical concept, argument for the sake of commu-
nity, seems particularly vivid in Saul. It stands out in Judge Potter's
personal investment, imagination, and compassion for the lawyers
and judges who are law's actors and for the society law affects. 73
In part then the communitarian rhetoric of Saul's message sug-
gests its place as altruistic argument. To illustrate, assume that
Judge Potter chose instead to ridicule choice of law and those who
take it seriously.74 This too would have been an attempt at altruistic
argument because it would have been argument off the subject of de-
cision, to a larger audience, and about more general legal concerns.
However, it would be a failed attempt. 75 It would instead be bad
rhetoric, ridicule of the efforts of others to make something out of con-
70. White, supra n. 57, at 28.
71. See, e.g., "Symposium: Law and Civil Society," 72 Ind. L. J. 335 (1997). One of
the contributors described the position of the "modem communitarian movement" as
"arguing that certain communities so deeplr shape their members that they are con-
stitutive of their identities." Williams, "A Feminist Reassessment of Civil Society," 72
Ind. L. J. 417, 419 (1997). Additional studies of communitarianism include Daniel
Bell, Communitarianism and its Critics (1993); Universalism vs. Communitarianism
(David Rasmussen, ed. 1990).
72. See supra n. 58 and accompanying text.
73. Various statements of this ideal appear in White, "What is an Opinion For?,"
62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1363, 1367-69 (1995); Nussbaum, "Poets as Judges: Judicial Rheto-
ric and the Literary Imagination," 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1477, 1482, 1519 (1995). This is
not to suggest that communitarianism can be embraced uncritically. For example,
Professor Susan Williams writes, "the endorsement of existing communal forms and
institutions-including the patriarchal family-is unacceptable to feminists who have
been struggling to reveal the oppressive nature of such institutions." Supra n 70, -at
422-23. Anyone proposing a communitarian approach to law, as I do in this Essay,
must acknowledge that the "community" must become more accommodating. See gen-
erally, Ethnicity and Group Rights (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlika, eds., Nomos XXXIX,
1997); and the sources appearing under the heading, "outsider scholarship," in supra
n. 4.
74. For examples this behavior in conflicts opinions, see supra n. 39.
75. An opinion may be authoritarian or democratic, generous or mean spir-
ited, doctrinaire or open to multiple arguments, and so on-indeed, it may
exhibit many of the ethical and political qualities that other kinds of conduct
can.
White, supra n. 73, at 1367.
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flicts law-an example of what one commentator has labeled "the
rhetoric of reaction."76
By definition, "altruistic" argument would "be actuated by the
well-being of others."77 Inclusive, empathic and collaborative, altru-
ism is a powerful idea in fields like science 78 and education.79 The
rendering of altruism by communitarian rhetoric provides the first
half of our theory of value for altruistic judicial argument. For a use-
ful formulation, we turn again to Professor White:
If an opinion is narrow minded or unperceptive or dishonest
or authoritarian, it will trivialize the experience of those it
talks about, and it will trivialize the law too. If it is open
and generous, full of excitement at the importance it gives to
the events and the people it speaks of, and to its own treat-
ment of them as well, it will dignify the experience of those it
talks of, in so doing it will dignify the law itself. It may even
be touched by nobility.80
Pragmatism is also humanitarian in purpose, but in a more
roundabout way than communitarian rhetoric. The latter ministers
directly to human needs; pragmatism does so indirectly through the
improvement of knowledge. Pragmatism is "geared to inquiring after
the possibilities of science and of democracy and to finding a mean-
ingful life for the individual."81 Pragmatism's contribution to our un-
derstanding of altruistic argument comes from its tolerant,
inquisitive way of perceiving the clash of ideas,8 2 its skepticism about
the intractability of problems,8 3 its energetic search for solutions
76. Albert 0. Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction (1991). The author discusses
practices of "criticizing, assaulting, and ridiculing" to develop theses of "perversity,"
"futility" and "jeopardy". Id. at 7.
77. The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary Vol. 1, p. 65 (19.71).
78. John A. Schumacher, Human Posture-The Nature of Human Inquiry 15
(1989).
79. Robert Coles, The Moral Intelligence of Children (1997).
80. White, supra n. 73, at 1368. White is not directing his discussion, as we are, to
judicial argument disconnected from decision. Yet his means of differentiating good
from bad judicial argument in general applies equally well in sorting good from bad
attempts at altruistic argument.
81. Hans Joas, Pragmatism and Social Theory 1 (1993).
82. This picture extends to the beginning of pragmatism. Despite their fondness
for empiricism and scientific method, first-generation pragmatists directed their ener-
gies into the world of ideas. And they did so without the foundational, reductive bi-
ases of their predecessors.
[T]hey avoided replacing metaphysical assumptions with new certainties
based on some philosophy of history, or theory of Reason, and did not regard
the end of these certainties as a cause for desperation. * * * As they saw it,
neither science nor democracy had ceased to have validity simply because it
no longer seemed possible to provide any final justifications for them.
Boas, id. at 1.
83. The spirit of pragmatism is to welcome the challenge of problems, to formu-
late and resolve problems in a way most helpful to society. This is best represented in
Dewey's own instrumental description of problems and problem solving.
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through observation and experience.8 4 Communitarian rhetoric pro-
motes harmony and growth within communities of people. Pragma-
tism seeks the same for communities of ideas.8 5 Both contribute to
the healing and mediating properties of altruistic judicial argument.
The pragmatism of Judge Potter's argument is evident in his re-
fusal either to disparage conflicts law or to choose sides on the doubt-
ful premise that one school of thought is or could possibly be superior
to all others. Judge Potter's attitude toward the elaborate, contend-
ing conflicts theories of his time was characteristic of pragmatists,
who "argue that the grand theories, if understood as partial perspec-
tives, do not cancel each other out, but rather that each of them has
something to contribute to the understanding of law."8 6
It marks Saul's pragmatism that, by example and by exhorta-
tion, Judge Potter expressed the need for an open mind about a very
difficult legal subject. Many judges and far too many conflicts com-
mentators have been less pragmatic. The judges in this category
tend to be hostile to theory.8 7 Commentators tend to embrace a sin-
gle complex conflicts theory to the exclusion of all others. 88 Theory
We compare life to a traveler faring forth. We may consider him first at a
moment where his activity is confident, straightforward, organized. He
marches on giving no direct attention to his path, nor thinking of his destina-
tion. Abruptly he is pulled up, arrested. Something is going wrong in his
activity. From the standpoint of an onlooker, he has met an obstacle which
must be overcome before his behavior can be unified into a successful ongo-
ing. From his own standpoint, there is shock, confusion, perturbation, uncer-
tainty. For the moment he doesn't know what hit him... nor where he is
going. But a new impulse is stirred which becomes the starting point of an
investigation, a looking into things, a trying to see them, to find out what isgoing on. Habits which were interfered with begin to get a new direction as
they cluster about the impulse to look and see. The blocked habits of locomo-
tion give him a sense of where he wAs going, of what he had set out to do, and
of the ground already traversed. As he looks, he sees definite things which
are not just things at large but which are related to his course of action. The
momentum of the activity entered upon persists as a sense of direction, of
aim; it is an anticipatory project. In short, he recollects, observes and plans.
John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct 181-82 (Modern Library ed. 1930) (empha-
sis in original). For discussions of Dewey's instrumentalism and its central place in
pragmatism, see Campbell, supra n. 59, at 13-22; Parodi, "Knowledge and Action in
Dewey's Philosophy," appearing in The Philosophy of John Dewey 229-42 (Paul Ar-
thur Schlipp & Lewis Edwin Hahn, eds., 3rd ed. 1989); Thayer, supra n. 59, at 169-74;
White, The Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism, supra n. 59.
84. In pragmatism, human beings, their purposes, and their actions occupy
the central position in the universe. The very word "pragmatism" signifies
an act, deed or affair. It can hardly be surprising, then, that when this philos-
ophy became prominent in America, legal theorists came to see law more as
an instrument for human use than as an abstract object for disinterested
analysis and study.
Summers, supra n. 64, at 31.
85. See supra n. 66 and accompanying text.
86. Grey, supra n. 63, at 37-38.
87. For examples, see the judges quoted in supra n. 39.
88. [Slcholars have written massive articles attempting to reconceptualize
the subject. These exercises in conflicts metatheory are erudite and highly
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can be exasperating,8 9 and it takes a special kind of inquisitiveness
and stamina to keep an open mind on complex theoretical matters in
the law. Pragmatism in altruistic argument provides direction, stim-
ulus, and human support 90 for such an undertaking.
There is a concord in altruistic argument between the humanism
of communitarian rhetoric and pragmatist attentiveness to a commu-
nity of ideas. Argument best suited to the ends of each proceeds in a
tone of patience and civility. And, like communitarian rhetoric, prag-
matism values human community.9 1 The two conceptions of commu-
nity are sufficiently close that by straining we probably could have
used either rhetoric or pragmatism alone to fill out our complete pic-
ture of altruistic argument. But it is helpful that both apply, for
each places half of the picture in full perspective.
ambitious. But they are also abstruse, contentious, and virtually impossible
to convert into practice or to assimilate into a more catholic understanding of
conflicts theory.
Shreve, Notes From the Eye of the Storm, supra n. 41, at 828. The tactful but trench-
ant reaction of a pragmatist to this state of affairs might be to muse: "so often we
think the problem 'solved' when our abstraction has so overcome our opponent's that,
for the moment, he can think of no other abstraction with which to counter-attack."
Geiger, "Dewey's Social and Political Philosophy," appearing in The Philosophy of
John Dewey, supra n. 59, at 345-46.
89. Theory wields a double intimidation; on the one hand it suggests the per-
tinence of a vast range of things you don't know, but if you attempt to catch
up, put a lot of work into reading and the things people tell you should know,
you discover that theory is not settled knowledge that you can comfortably
apply. Theory is not a field you could ever master, though it simultaneously
presents mastery as a goal (you hope that theoretical reading will give you
the concepts, the metalanguage, to order and understand the phenomena
that concern you) and makes mastery impossible, not just because there is
always more to know, but more specifically and more painfully because the-
ory is itself the questioning of presumed results and the assumptions on
which they are based. The nature of theory, by this account, is to undo,
through a contesting of premises and postulates, what you thought you
knew, so that there may appear to be no real accumulation of knowledge or
expertise.
Culler, "Introduction: What's the Point?" appearing in The Point of Theory-Practices
of Cultural Analysis 14-15 (Mieke Bal & Inge E. Boer, eds. 1994).
90. A compassionate force has long been evident in pragmatism. Dewey's concern
about the conditions of life for others in society has been well-documented. E.g.,
James Livingston, Pragmatism and the Political Economy of the Cultural Revolution
188-89 (1994); Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy-A Genealogy of
Pragmatism 80-81 (1989); Jurgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society 68-69
(1970); Richard Hofstadler, The Age of Reform 154 (1955); Campbell, supra n. 59, at
144-51; Westbrook, supra n. 59, passim; Hook, supra n. 59, at 226-39. William James
exhibited that concern. Hilary Putnam, Pragmatism 23 (1995); Perry, supra n. 59, at
122; Myers, supra n. 59, at 424. So did G.H. Mead; Joas, supra n. 59, at 21-26.
91. Pragmatism took exception to the stark individualism of formal, classic
liberalism and stressed the cooperative nature of human endeavor. It image
of reason was not the endless calculation of self-interest but the collaborative
contrivance of workable methods of action.
Charles W. Anderson, Pragmatic Liberalism 1 (1990). Cf. Putnam, "A Reconsideration
of Deweyan Democracy," 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1671, 1674 (1990) (describing "Dewey's
justification" as "a social justification-that is, one addressed to the community as a
whole rather than to each member of the community").
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What help have uses of rhetoric and pragmatism turned out to be
to our investigation? They have verified our intuition that Saul repre-
sents altruistic argument. But what have rhetoric and pragmatism
contributed to a general distinction between good and bad attempts-
to isolation, definition, and valuation of altruistic judicial argument?
Here is what we can say. Judicial argument that is entirely indiffer-
ent to the correctness of the ruling does not, by that alone, succeed as
altruistic argument. On the other hand, it would be wrong to say
that particular arguments are truly altruistic only if we agree with
them. Altruistic argument must reflect some high civic impulse,
whether solicitude for law, or for those it affects, or for those in the
legal community required to use it. Rhetoric and pragmatism help to
articulate these features in altruistic argument.
(2) Double Checking the Contributions of Rhetoric and
Pragmatism: the Banality/Relativism Question
Resistance to the conception of altruistic argument is to be ex-
pected within the legal community.9 2 However, there is a different
kind of resistance that must be noted. The precepts of rhetoric and
pragmatism upon which my idea of altruistic argument depends are
familiar to practitioners of those disciplines, but they are also contro-
verted. By entering in a small way the interdisciplinary discourse
about the contemporary value of rhetoric and pragmatism, this Essay
becomes open to criticisms found in that discourse. Unfortunately,
space remains only to discuss the most persistent of these criticisms:
attacks of banality and relativism.
The charge of banality can be made against rhetoric, 93 but sur-
faces more often today against pragmatism. Usages of pragmatism
in legal writing merely to underscore the value of practicality or com-
mon sense94 do not draw such criticism. It is only when (as in this
92. Conservatism runs deep in our judiciary. Even one of most enlightened jurists
wrote: "There is something monstrous in commands couched in invented and unfamil-
iar language; an alien master is the worst of all. The language of the law must not be
foreign to the ears of those who are to obey it." Hand, "Is There a Common Will?," 28
Mich. L. Rev. 46, 52 (1929).
93. See Bernard S. Jackson, Making Sense in Law-Linguistic, Psychological and
Semiotic Perspectives 62 (1995) (noting the challenge that "rhetoric... becomes any
successful communication."). Cf. Mcarthur, supra n. 55, at 866 ("As the 19c
progressed, the ancient theorists became of less and less interest, except to classical
scholars, and rhetoric became for many either the (empty) forms of public speaking or
the study of writing and composition in schools."); Vayne, "The Roman Empire," ap-
pearing in A History of Private Life 20, 23 (Paul Vayne, ed. & Arthur Goldhammer,
trans. 1987) ("in Rome the minds of little boys were decked out with rhetoric, much as
in the last century the bodies of little boys were decked out with sailor suits or mili-
tary uniforms. * * * There was a gulf between true eloquence and rhetorical teaching,
which the ancients never ceased to deplore even as they delighted in it.").
94. In popular usage, pragmatism connotes purposeful conduct, a preference
for weighing the effects of possible actions and choosing the most practical
course. Pragmatism's commonly accepted role in legal discourse is much the
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Essay) a greater, more freestanding role is assigned to pragmatism
that accusations of banality arise. 95 Charges of relativism 96 made
against rhetoric97 and (more frequently) against pragmatism repre-
sent the same attack from a different direction. If the two are banal,
they can be used to dress up any point of view. Thus, J.M. Balkin
offered as a reason for becoming a legal pragmatist: "You can also be
(a) a. civil republican, (b) a feminist, (c) a deconstructionist, (d) a case-
cruncher, (e) a crit, (f) a law-and-economics type, or (g) anything
else."98
The brunt of the banality\relativism attack has been directed at
a supposed frailty in pragmatism, sometimes called the "fact/value
dichotomy."99 This is the problem.
Pragmatism, particularly the Deweyan side most influ-
ential today, is designed around the process of finding and
solving problems. But what are the problems? How, when
and why do we define them? Pragmatism is often thought to
eschew moral (substantive) values, but it must have a moral
base somewhere to escape relativism. That is, pragmatism
can neither call something a problem nor value one solution
to it over another without substantive reference points.
Hence the dilemma. If pragmatism is substantive, does it
same: a kind of ad hoc exhortation that we keep an eye on the reliability of
our methods and the success of our results.
Shreve, supra n. 66, at 26-27 (citations omitted).
95. "[Ihf legal pragmatism is only eclectic, result-oriented, historically minded an-
tiformalism, it turns out to be a remarkably uncontroversial doctrine. It stands free
of philosophical controversy only because it stands free of all controversy, and it
avoids controversy by saying very little." Luban, "What's Pragmatic About Legal
Pragmatism?" 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 43, 45 (1996) (emphasis in original). Cf. Balkin,
"The Top Ten Reasons to Be a Legal Pragmatist," 8 Constitutional Commentary 351,
351 (1991) ("Being a legal pragmatist means never having to say you have a theory.");
Rorty, "The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice," 63 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1811, 1813 (1990) ("Pragmatism was reasonably shocking seventy years ago, but in
the ensuing decades it has gradually been absorbed into American common sense.");
Albert Schinz, Anti-Pragmatism 286 (1909) ("Common sense, left to itself, settles
nothing.").
96. Relativism has been defined as holding "that there are no universal truths
about the world: the world has no intrinsic characteristics, there are just different
ways of interpreting it." Pojman, "Relativism," appearing in the Cambridge Diction-
ary of Philosophy 690 (1995); as the "permanently tempting doctrine that in some
areas at least, truth itself is relative to the standpoint of the judging Subject." Simon
Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy 326 (1994).
In philosophical writing, relativism is not always a disparaging term. See, e.g.,
Richard Rorty's sympathetic conception of relativism in Philosophy and the Mirror of
Nature 373-79 (1979).
97. One of the definitions of rhetoric accepted for "more than 2000 years" is: "An
insincere eloquence intended to win points and get people what they want." McAr-
thur, supra n. 55, at 863.
98. Balkin, supra n. 95, at 351. See also Minow & Spellman, "In Context," 65 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1597 (1990); Singer, "Should Lawyers Care About Philosophy?" 1989
Duke L.J. 1752, 1754-55; Schrag, supra n. 7, at 171.
99. Putnam, supra n. 62, at 12.
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contradict itself? If pragmatism lacks substantive reference,
is it not hopelessly relativistic?100
In keeping with the views of Hillary Putnam, 10 Richard Bern-
stein,10 2 Thomas Grey,' 03 and Robert Summers, 04 the "community
of ideas" concept of this Essay seeks a way out of the dilemma. Prag-
matism can have a distinctive resonance and a place within a com-
munity of grand theories without itself becoming one more competing
theory. Michael Moore is wrong in maintaining the contrary, that
"[d]ifferent types of legal theory must genuinely compete with each
other about the nature of some aspect of the law."10 5
For example, if solutions for a legal problem posed from the value
systems of natural law, positivism, and historical jurisprudence con-
flict,10 6 Dewey's instrumental pragmatism could function separately
not to provide a fourth contending solution but to clarify and mediate
debate among the other three.' 07 As Putnam explained:
[N]o distinction is more insistent in Dewey's writing than
the distinction between the valued and the VALUABLE.
Dewey's answer to the question, "What makes something
valuable as opposed merely to being valued? is, in a word,
criticism. Objective value arises, not from a special "sense
organ," but from the criticism of our valuations. Valuations
are incessant and inseparable from all of our activities...,
but it is by intelligent reflection on our valuations, intelli-
gent reflection of the kind that Dewey calls "criticism," that
we conclude that some of them are warranted while others
are unwarranted." 0 8
CONCLUSION
My purpose has been to examine the hitherto neglected phenom-
enon of altruistic judicial argument, and to do so in a way that gives
readers a sense of the current jurisprudential climate in the United
States. In the process, the Essay has undertaken a series of overlap-
100. Shreve, supra n. 66, at 34-35.
101. Putnam, supra n. 91; 1682-83; Putnam, supra n. 62, at 13-16; Putnam, supra
n. 90, at 57.
102. Bernstein, supra n. 67, at 260-72.
103. Supra n. 86 and accompanying text.
104. Summers, supra n. 64, at 20-22.
105. Moore, "The Need for a Theory of Legal Theories: Assessing Pragmatic Instru-
mentalism," 69 Cornell L. Rev. 988, 1012 (1984).
106. On tensions between these three kinds ofjurisprudence, see Berman, supra n.
4.
107. See supra n. 66 and accompanying text.
108. Putnam, supra n. 62, at 13. Pragmatism is therefore both humble and sub-
lime. It is "a philosophy rooted in common sense and dedicated to the transformation




ping projects. The first was to isolate, define and evaluate altruistic
judicial argument. The second was to demonstrate how the interdis-
ciplinary turn in legal criticism can evolve naturally out of traditional
legal inquiry. The third was to propose an alloy of rhetoric and prag-
matism to extend the idea of community both to persons and to ideas.
The problems raised in this Essay would profit from a longer
study. This is especially true concerning the interdisciplinary discus-
sion in PART IV. Insofar as I have merely applied ideas about rhetoric
and pragmatism from existing paradigms, the contribution possible
for the Essay would be, to paraphrase Thomas Kuhn's comment on
the natural sciences,
an actualization achieved by extending the knowledge of
those facts that the paradigm displays as particularly re-
vealing, by increasing the extent of the match between those
facts and the paradigm's predictions, and by further articu-
lation of the paradigm itself.10 9
If, however, the communitarian synthesis of rhetoric and prag-
matism offered in this Essay represents something beyond any estab-
lished paradigm, and if it has aided investigation of altruistic judicial
argument, it may be useful in many other settings as well.
109. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 24 (3d ed. 1996). As
Kuhn notes, the effect of a paradigm in sweeping away prior, divergent approaches
probably has no counterpart outside the sciences. id. at 17. Rather, legal criticism
presents the opportunity for simultaneous development of many paradigms.
Kuhn's powerful, paradigm-based imagery nonetheless helps to set apart the impor-
tant functions of application and innovation when we think of rhetoric and pragma-
tism as legal theory.
19981
68 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 46
